Interpretation of a Regularity i n t he
a decade and can be interpreted reasonably, there is no justification for overlooking it.
In brief, during the past quarter-century, the broadest M categories-M3 and M5, both of which contain major interest-yielding components that cannot be used directly as means of payments-have so far behaved as "luxury goods": their ratio to the gross national product has been rising with the real GNP of the American economy. In cross-sections, this phenomenon would not necessarily be reflected throughout the income scale.2
Within the more inclusive categories of M, the ratio of the higher-to the lower-yielding components has risen since World War II. The growth rate of the ratio of the non-Ml component of M2 (that is, commercialbank time deposits and savings accounts) to the M1 stock has been well maintained. The ratio of thrift-institution deposits to M2 and to M1 has also risen but at a diminishing rate and the same is true of the ratio of thrift-institution deposits plus large CDs to M2 and to M1. At first, this substitution, which reduced the costs of maintaining the successive mixes of Ms, took place in two ways: ( 1 ) by the accumulation of the addition to M3 and M5 per unit of GNP in the form of the higher-yielding M components, and (2) by a reduction per unit of GNP of the lower-yielding and the interest-free components of M3 and M5. In the sixties this decelerating substitution away from M2 toward higher-yielding M assets began to be accomplished by the first method alone, with no reliance on the second. For reasons discussed below, the downward trend in M1 per unit of GNP seems to have shown only a temporary analogous tendency to flatten out.
2. Aside from the usual problems of reconciling aggregative behavior reflected in time series with individual behavior observed in cross-sections, a further complication here is that a high relative position in a cross-section may often be the consequence of smaller risk aversion than is typical at that time of those occupying a lower position. The economically successful may thus show lower risk aversion than the unsuccessful and yet their risk aversion may be higher than it was before they rose on the income scale. Furthermore, even if everyone showed declining risk aversion with a rise of income by holding a diminishing proportion of their wealth in liquid form, they could still hold larger liquid assets in proportion to their current income. Information for a thorough exploration of this problem is lacking, but data relating to 1962 do suggest a more than proportionate rise in M holdings with rising income over a substantial segment of the income scale; see Dorothy S. Projector and Gertrude S. Weiss, Survey of Financial Characteristics of Consumers (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1966).
In a process of decelerating substitution, there are reasons to expect a stage such as that illustrated by the behavior of M2 during the sixties and seventies. To use an analogy, if with the passage of time a household spends an increasing proportion of its rising income on a luxury good but reduces the expenses of acquiring it by shifting toward less expensive brands, it can do this by reducing in relation to its income its acquisition of the more expensive brands as well as by putting all of the increment into the less expensive brands. Yet it is a reasonable assumption about utility functions that, as its income rises and its effort to lower the acquisition costs slackens, the household will stop reducing in relation to its income its acquisition of the better brands before it stops making all additions in the form of the less expensive ones. In terms of our analogy, an M brand is "better," but also more expensive, the nearer it is in the spectrum to money in the narrower sense of means of payment. While the influence of the business sector's M holdings on the trends in the economy call for some qualifications to this analogy, they will not be of great quantitative importance in our exploration of the behavior of M2.
This interpretation of developments during more than two decades may be tied in with trends of the more distant past. The work of Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz has demonstrated that in the historical long run, conceived of as extending back to the years following the Civil War, the ratio of M2 to income had an appreciable upward trend.3 However, this trend did not last beyond World War II. For several years-perhaps into the early fifties-the postwar reversal of the upward trend in M2 per unit of GNP represented merely an offset to the particularly steep increase during the war; but this interpretation clearly cannot serve beyond the early fifties. Since that time, M2 per unit of GNP at first showed a downward trend, followed in the early sixties by a horizontal trend, as Friedman noted in a discussion presented some years after the publication of the Friedman-Schwartz volume.4 This does not exclude the possibility that M2 has maintained its "luxury good" character, in the sense of having greater than unitary income elasticity that may have been offset by other variables. This possibility will also be examined in the paper. Yet even in this event the income elasticity of the higher-yielding components of M. and of M5 seems to have become much greater than that of M2.
As we see it, the likely explanation is that the non-M2 components of the broader M aggregates did not acquire their great significance until quite late in the Friedman-Schwartz historical long run and that until that time M2 thus played a role much more similar to the recent role of M3 and M,. During those many decades M2 too showed an upward trend relative to GNP, while subsequently this trend was shown only by the highersubscript M components. As concerns the upward trend, the higheryielding components seem to have taken over at a time when federal insurance of thrift-institution deposits was spreading rapidly and the demand for the funds supplied by these institutions was strong. Whereas only in the earliest phases of the shift of the M mix toward the higheryielding components was the process associated with a reduction of M2 per unit of GNP, it has remained associated with a reduction of the ratio of M1 to GNP, and also with a reduction, in relation to GNP, of specific holdings of liquid assets not included in any M concept. It follows that from the early sixties on, the reduction of M1 per unit of GNP has represented on balance a transfer to the M2 component consisting of commercial-bank time deposits and savings accounts which have risen correspondingly. This is what is expressed by the trendless "M2 velocity."
Horizontality of the k2 Trend
In the analysis that follows, k, denotes a liquidity ratio expressed as the reciprocal of the GNP velocity of M1, or M1 per unit of GNP; GNP is measured at annual rates, and M1 as average holdings during the same period; k2, k3, and k5 denote the analogously defined lagless "Cambridge k" terms for M2, M3, and M5, respectively;5 knonV, knon2, knon3 denote the "Cambridge k" applicable to M5 -M1, M5-M2, and M5 -M3, respectively. 
The Upward Trend in k3 and k5
Both in 1953-62, when k2 declined at an annual compound rate of 1.2 percent, and over the subsequent period of k2 horizontally, k3 and k5 rose appreciably along the growth path of real GNP. However, this uptrend was interrupted for fully five years during the exceptionally long expansion in the second half of the sixties, and throughout our period it was not uncommon for this trend to be interrupted (and even reversed for a while) during cyclical expansions. The reason why the trend has come through is that the sharp rises in recession years have been greater than any reduction during expansion years. This is illustrated by figure 1 and can be seen also in table 1, both of which suggest a tendency of the public to raise k3 and k5 during recessions to such an extent that any liquidity loss that may occur during the next expansion should start from a higher level than it did on the previous occasion.
The results can be expressed by log-linear regressions in which k3 or k5 is the dependent variable and aggregate real GNP and the interest rate on three-month Treasury bills are the independent variables. The coefficient of real GNP comes out positive, that of the bill rate (or, alternatively, of the commercial paper rate) negative. The regressions are reported below. In this context we were unable to identify the complex consequences of population growth.7
(1)
In k3 where Y is real GNP, r is the Treasury bill rate, and the numbers in parentheses are t-ratios (here and in later equations), and the data are quarterly observations.
Here and in other regressions of this type containing a lagged term on the righthand side, the long-term elasticities corresponding to the coefficients of the explanatory variables (here, of Y and r) are found by dividing these coefficients by the difference between the number 1 and the coefficient of the lagged term.
Equations similar to 2 hold for the preceding period starting in 1952, with both the Y and the r elasticities smaller in absolute value (but significant by conventional standards), and with the adjustment much faster-that is, with the coefficients of the There is good reason for not relying heavily on the numerical results of such regression analysis. The specification of models of this general type is inevitably incomplete. For one thing, there is no way to measure expectations held with changing uncertainty concerning a cyclically sensitive rate of return that bears closely on the attractiveness of physical goods (on investment in the broad sense). Even with hindsight that rate of return cannot be measured properly. The regression results hide this deficiency by "pretending" that decisionmakers experiencing a rise in income move up to the desired higher money holdings very slowly, even though in the given circumstances this is unlikely because usually money intake is increasing at the same time. What happens in these situations is not a genuinely slow movement toward desired levels but a temporary reduction of the desired level of money holdings relative to income-a delay in developing the desire to accumulate the money balances for which there will subsequently be a demand. The delay occurs because of a temporary rise of an unmeasured expected rate of return during cyclical expansions. The computational results hide this for the sample period by suggesting a low speed of adjustment to desired levels, and the elasticities obtained cannot be expected to reflect accurately the long-run effect of unspecified variables. If the log of M rather than the log of k were defined lagged term much smaller (0.493 instead of 0.925). Until 1961 there was no difference between k3 and k5.
Figure 1 suggests why models of this sort are apt to show particularly slow adjustment for the post-1962 span in which the very long expansion phase of a cycle interrupted the rise of k3 and of k5 for several years. Taking care of such delays by low adjustment coefficients reflects a basic shortcoming of such models, as our subsequent discussion suggests.
As for the behavior of large negotiable CDs per unit of GNP-k,on3, which even now is a small fraction of k5-inferences for the future drawn by comparing equations 1 and 2 are practically certain to be wrong. As a result of the difference between the two adjustment coefficients, that comparison implies a negative long-term r elasticity for the CDs. This particular implication is indeed likely to have been realistic for the sixties, when the CDs were subject to interest ceilings. For 1970, when interest ceilings were removed from large CDs of less than 90-day maturity, the data convey the same impression of a negative relation between the rate of change in the volume of CDs and the interest rates on money-market instruments, not because the ceilings on longer maturities were removed only later, but because the volume of the newly deregulated CDs rose rapidly while money-market rates declined though remaining above time-deposit rates. But no reasonable observer could avoid the conclusion that from 1973 on CD holdings were positively and strongly correlated with money-market rates-not negatively, as a comparison of our two equations would suggest for periods longer than one quarter. as the dependent variable, the "cover-up" would be even more complete, and by some criteria the regression results would appear to be even "better," but for the wrong reason. This and some further considerations have led us to choose k rather than M as the variable to be explained.8 Increasing amounts have been accumulated per unit of the growing GNP not only of M3 and of M5 but also of the broader aggregate that the Federal Reserve calls liquid assets held by private nonfinancial domestic owners. However, this more comprehensive liquidity ratio rose somewhat less because its non-M components have declined relative to the GNPfrom about 15 to 11 percent in the past sixteen years.
Methods of "Cheapening" the Rising Liquidity Provisions
Tables 2 and 3 illustrate how the increasing provisions of k3 and k5 along the growth path have been made less expensive to the public by a shift from k, to knon, and from k2 to kn,02. The tables also reveal that for some time the rise in the ratio of knoni to k, and in the ratio of knon2 to k2 had 8. In an "M model" other than one applying to Ml, the computational techniques establish a significantly less than unitary coefficient for the log of Y along with a greater than unitary long-term income elasticity of M, thus giving the impression that this very large difference is attributable to slow reactions in achieving desired objectives, though in reality the delay reflects the effect of an unspecified variable bearing on the objectives themselves. In a "k model" the misleading explanation of the delay is much less complete-hence weaker test results serve as warning signalsbecause the techniques cannot associate a negative coefficient for the log of Y with a positive long-term income elasticity of k (and this would be the analogy to what is happening in the M models).
It should be noted also that since random movements of a decision unit's Y are here usually associated with random movements of its M intake in the same direction, the risk of obtaining a spurious negative correlation between M/Y(=k) and Y is small. Also, because random movements in M/Y are apt to be fewer or less pronounced than random movements in M, the disturbing effect of random movements on the results of the next period (via the lagged term) is apt to be smaller in k than in M models.
Yet the two types of model share other basic shortcomings. These include the consequences of our inability to appraise accurately the uncertainty surrounding expectations concerning movements in market rates of interest and thus the attractiveness of the prevailing long rates relative to the various deposit rates and relative to the CD rate and the bill or the paper rate. In this regard, as well as with respect to the uncertainty surrounding the rates on physical investment, the hypothetical steady long-run conditions that are supposed to be described by the elasticities have different implications from those of the sequences of disequilibria actually observed in time series. developed both because k, and k2 had declined and because k0onl and knon2 had risen. At some point in this process, increases in the ratio of knon2 to k2 came to be achieved by a rise in knon2 alone without the reinforcement of reductions in k2.
We now turn to our suggestion that the k, trend might also have moved toward horizontality had there not been special incentives for a renewed dip. For the household sector such a flattening of the k, trend would have meant heavy reliance on the rise of kn.n0 for a further reduction of the cost of the still rising k3 and k5 provisions; while for business enterprise a flattening would not call for similar emphasis on the substitution of higheryielding M assets (rather than other assets) for M1.
During . Among the quantitative statements that can be made, relatively the safest are that (1) in the absence of new incentives, the reductions of k, and of k2 do not last beyond a limited period; (2) therefore, the substitution of higher-for lower-yielding M and k components-the rise of ratios such as knon2/k2 and knon,/k,-comes to depend increasingly on the factors determining the rise in k3 and in k5; (3) the growth of real GNP and changes in returns on rival assets presumably are prominent determinants of the trend in k, and k5. Applying analysis based on unchanging parameter values to the flattening-out phase of the lower-subscript ks, or to a renewed dip resulting from a revision of the attitudes that led to the flattening, is not a promising undertaking.
In considering incentives for revising such attitudes concerning kl, two factors deserve emphasis. One is that the incentive provided by the availability of, say, 5 percent interest on commercial-bank savings accounts means more in terms of utility if the interest earnings greatly reduce or eliminate a continuing erosion of the real value of interest-free liquid assets than if they merely bring a real gain over the maintenance of the real value of a liquid asset. Thus inflation is likely to have been one of the essential causes of the new dip of k,. The other important factor is that the prompt transformation of commercial-bank savings accounts into checking deposits has become so smooth that, if depositors have the two kinds of accounts in the same bank, they may by now view their checks as reasonably safe against bouncing. Furthermore, after 1971, when k, dipped again significantly, interest rates on commercial-bank savings accounts continued to rise, even if somewhat less than during 1966-71. Also, corporations were recently permitted to hold limited commercial-bank savings accounts, with effects that will show up mostly in the data after 1975. At present k, ratios continue to move lower.
No comparable incentives have so far developed to revise the attitudes that led to a flattening of the k2 trend in the early sixties. The differential between the passbook rates of thrift institutions and commercial banks diminished to one-quarter of 1 percent during that period (though both rates increased). On the other hand, rates of return on large CDs increased in some years greatly to the advantage of these assets; but this trend did not hold in all subperiods, and access to these assets is limited. To reduce k2 by moving into goods rather than into higher-yielding M components remains too risky for the typical household; their demand for interestbearing M seems in fact to have been strengthened, rather than weakened, by the uncertainties concerning borrowing opportunities and other matters in the recent inflationary period. The qualifications called for by the relatively small share of business in M2 were considered above, and here we may conclude that the k2 problem understandably has characteristics very different from those of the k, problem. So far there have developed no incentives for revising the attitudes that led to a flattening of k2 in the early sixties.
Slowing of the Substitution of Higher-Yielding M Assets for M2
Assuming that the k2 trend is horizontal and that the k5 trend reflects variables such as real GNP and rates of interest on money-market instruments, the trend in knon2/k2 from now on will depend exclusively on the same variables. Observed trends and regressions such as 1 and 2 in note 7 suggest this sort of substitution process. One implication of this suggestion is that, with a horizontal k2 trend and a constant rate of increase of k5, the increase in the kn0n2/k2 ratio would continue to slow, because knfl.2 would make up a continuously rising proportion of k5 and hence the extent to which the growth rate of k0on2 would exceed the assumed constant growth rate of k5 would be lessening continuously.
However, this conclusion is based on the behavior of k3 and k5 alone, which only for a given trend in k2 determines the behavior of the ratio of the higher-yielding k components to k2-that is, the substitution ratio. The special uncertainties in appraising the influence of the same "explanatory" variables-such as real GNP and interest rates-on the behavior of k2 itself are disturbing if the question is how long the k2 trend will remain horizontal.
Reasons for Abstaining from Mechanical Projections
Several important reasons caution against simple mechanical projection of the k2 trend. First, analysis of this sort is uncomfortably aggregative. We have looked at some disaggregated data that do not seem to contradict our hypothesis but also do not support an equally clear-cut disaggregated story in all details, and the level of aggregation here warns against overconfidence. Second, we have not attempted to appraise the role of a number of economic variables in shaping the environment in which the observed regularities have developed. Last but not least, institutional developments, such as interest-rate regulations and the ease of transforming one type of M into another, are unpredictable. In particular, if and when shifting thrift-institution deposits into means of payment becomes sufficiently prompt, costless, and effortless, k3 might be the proper focus of analysis rather than k1 or k2.
Observations on an Analytic Ambiguity and ConcIuding Remarks
Assessing the future behavior of k2, even on the unrealistic assumption of unchanging interest regulations and institutional circumstances, calls for a firm view of what variables have determined the post-1962 deviations of k2 from its horizontal trend. The same variables could then be considered responsible for the trend horizontality since 1962, and any change in their behavior would put an end to the era of horizontality in a predictable way. But this effort encounters serious difficulties.
As figure 2 demonstrates, movements in money-market rates have been associated with movements of k9 in the opposite direction.'0 However, the 10. The graph is a plot of k2 against the commercial paper rate, but the same conclusion would be suggested by using the Treasury bill rate (see note 11).
On theoretical grounds one should use here the differential between a moneymarket rate and some representative commercial-bank deposit rate as well as the differential between some representative thrift-institution rate and the commercialbank deposit rate; but these would be hard to construct. It seemed preferable to imply that the large swings in money-market rates stand for movements relative to the upward creeping commercial-bank deposit rates. As was noted, the differential between the savings and loan and the commercial-bank passbook rates was slowly declining during that period. That differential has not proved a significant variable in a regression of the kind reproduced below. same figure-a simple regression with no adjustment for the role of other variables-shows that this effect was not symmetrical in the two directions. Therefore, the upward trend in interest rates during the period 1962-75 has not, on balance, become associated with a downward trend in k2. Something has suppressed any k2-reducing trend effect of interest rates.
It is very likely even on a priori grounds, and it is empirically demonstrable, that one of several measurable variables showing an upward trend can be introduced to "explain," in the purely technical sense, why the k2-reducing effect of the trend in interest rates was suppressed. One way is to introduce total real M liquidity-or better, its non-M2 component-as an additional variable, and to demonstrate that the sign of its coefficient is positive (and thus is the inverse of the sign of the coefficient of interest rates). Other variables, including real GNP, can also be made to perform this function of "offsetting" the trend effect of the commercial paper rate or, alternatively, of the Treasury bill rate."
If such regression results were taken at their face value, one would conclude that in a period of horizontal r trends, the k2 ratio would be rising, because the other variables-such as real liquidity or, alternatively, real income-would continue to show an upward trend. As will be seen, this upward trend in k2 would be very mild. Quite aside from this, these other variables could be stealing the show from an unmeasured variable in the background of the regressions. We suggested earlier that, whereas accelerating inflation probably played an essential role in promoting transfers from k, to the equally "safe" interest-bearing component of k2, it may also have raised k2 because it intensified uncertainties, especially about borrowing opportunities. This rising uncertainty is an unmeasured vari- We have not tried to "explain" our relatively brief pre-1962 downtrend in k2 in these terms. For such an effort to succeed, Y and r elasticities other than those estimated here would be required.
able not included in our regressions, but it has resulted from inflation along with the rising trend of the measured variable r. This could well be the reason why the behavior of r since 1962 has on balance been associated with neither a decrease nor an increase in k2, even though the shortrun effect of a change in r has been an opposite change in k2. On this interpretation, the measured variables that trend upward, and appear to explain the supression of the k2-reducing effect of the rising trend in r, have played no essential role. They merely continued to rise in a period in which inflation-induced uncertainty rose. Accordingly, a horizontal r trend would be associated with a horizontal k2 trend, not with a rising one.
Some considerations favor this latter interpretation, but others argue for leaving open the question of whether during the period of k2 trend horizontality the trend effect of rising interest rates was not, after all, offset by a measured variable with a rising trend, as various regressions suggest. One such reason is that any uncertainty that raises k2 might be expected to raise k3 as well. A k3-raising effect of inflation uncertainty would in turn imply that when k3 regressions, such as 1 and 2 in note 7, are estimated for 1953-75, they would underpredict k3 for 1965-75. This is so because in that period the rise in money rates of interest reflected inflation, while in the preceding years it did not. Yet the regressions we have examined do not indicate a tendency to underpredict k3 during 1965-75. On the other hand, inflation uncertainty could have raised k2 without raising k3 because of the pronounced narrowing of the margin between the passbook rates of thrift institutions and of commercial banks. Also, we had reason to question the numerical results derived from such regressions as 1 and 2.
Hence it remains an open question whether, during the period 1962-75, the effect on k2 of the trend in interest rates was suppressed by factors that would have been present even had the interest trend been horizontal (and in that case would have succeeded in raising k2) or by factors that come and go with the kind of inflation-induced interest trend observed during the past decade. Only in the latter case would the k2 trend have been horizontal even for a horizontal interest trend, and short-run fluctuations in r would then merely cause short-run deviations of k2 from its trend.
Pragmatically, this ambiguity may not deserve much attention. Even if the correct interpretation of the period of a horizontal k2 trend were that some variable such as total real M liquidity, or real non-M2 liquidity, or real income has tended to raise k2 while r has tended to reduce it, the prospective decennial rate of increase in k2 would probably be very small for a horizontal trend in money-market rates. A corollary is that it seems to take large changes in interest rates to have a noteworthy effect on k2. These conclusions follow from the parameter values referred to in note 1 1, on any reasonable assumption concerning trends in the explanatory variables.12
What stands up firmly is not the regression results-ours or those of other authors-but the horizontality of the k2 trend over about a decade and a half, with the dispersion characteristics discussed in this paper. Ambiguities in the interpretation of the regression results are, of course, disturbing, yet not because it would matter much whether k2 will be trendless or have a very mild trend. This is not the main reason for abstaining from mechanical projections of the behavior of k2 and for supporting one's views about the prospects by "judgmental" considerations. The main reasons are the uncertainties of aggregative analysis, the unpredictability of institutional change, and the vagueness of any appraisal of variables whose behavior may have shaped the environment in which various regularities have been observed. 12 . From 1953 to 1975 real M balances other than M2 rose at an annual compound rate of 7.8 percent, and from 1962 to 1975 the increase was smaller. Regression 3 suggests that a 7.8 percent increase would raise k2 by 3.2 percent of its present value in a decade. The regressions using real GNP rather than real Mn"n2 as an explanatory variable suggest an even smaller decennial increase in k2 for a 3.5 percent yearly growth of real GNP. To put it differently, all these regressions suggest that even if no variable had offset the k2-reducing effect of the r trend from 1962 to 1975, the k2-lowering effect of the interest movements would have been small. Some models seem to point to a somewhat greater k2-lowering effect of past trends in interest rates and, correspondingly, to a somewhat greater k2-raising effect of the offsetting trend in real GNP. But we find various properties of these models unconvincing.
Discussion
JAMES TOBIN REMINDED the conference that considerable stability in average velocity over a period is quite consistent with considerable variation in the rate of change of velocity. Since it is the rate of change of the money supply that is supposed to be important in stabilizing the economy, stability in the rate of change of velocity is a more important issue for policy purposes than the stability of velocity itself. Tobin reported that over the period 1965-74, average M2 velocity had indeed been constant: the mean rate of change was a trivial -0.3 percent per year. However, the standard deviation of quarterly changes of velocity was 3.4 percent (annual rate). Tobin inferred from this that one could not place much faith in a constant relationship between the rate of change of M2 and the rate of change of income. He had also experimented with lagged relationships; a typical example was the correlation of 0.4 that he had found between percentage changes of money income and percentage changes in M2 lagged two quarters. Robert J. Gordon reported similarly disappointing results from an effort to predict the growth of final sales from the recent growth of M2.
Tobin noted also that the broader the concept of money that is adopted as a control variable, the louder the noise that creeps in between the Federal Reserve's instruments of control-central bank reserves, discount rates, and so on-and the resulting outcome. Arthur Okun was concerned that the sudden adoption of M2 or any other aggregate as an instrument of policy control would change the supply function for that class of assets, thereby jeopardizing any previous regularity of its behavior. William Fellner pointed out that the paper was concerned with the small yearly and quarterly deviations of M2 velocity from the known mean values of more extended preceding periods, not with the larger deviations of one short period's value from that of the preceding quarter or year. He also stressed that, in pointing out the stability of the velocity of M2, the authors had not meant to imply the reliability of M2 as a single instrument of control. That issue required an understanding not only of the process of interest-rate determination but also of how other factors may have contributed to shaping the environment in which the M2 regularity was observed. Such an investigation went beyond the scope of their paper, and much of what is involved in this broader problem calls for "judgmental" appraisals.
Fellner and Stephen Goldfeld exchanged views on the difference in the functional forms in their respective papers. Fellner stated his preference for specifying the equation in terms of k, rather than M, because it had superior dynamic properties: for example, an increase in income led to an immediately rising k2, while Goldfeld's specification implied that k2 fell at first then rose. Goldfeld emphasized, however, that this was a result of differences in the underlying specifications of the equations and not simply of different forms of the dependent variable. Fellner agreed but reiterated his preference for a specification that did not rely on a lengthy process of stock adjustment that started by moving k2 in the opposite direction when income rose, and then turned around in this regard.
Tobin said that he could not find a clear conceptual basis for M2. M] could be characterized as the circulating medium of exchange and M3 as including all assets on which the interest rates are fixed by the government -either at zero or some other level; M2, on the other hand, seemed simply to be a measure of the size of commercial bank assets and liabilitiesexcluding certificates of deposit and bank capital. Fellner observed that the differences between M, and M2 have been narrowing and M2 can now be characterized as the medium of exchange, subject to a telephone call.
